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INTRODUCTION
People should follow the law, which includes the statutes
themselves and the judicial rulings interpreting those statutes.
However, if the binding judicial interpretation changes, should a party
be liable for following an old binding judicial interpretation of a
federal statute at a time when the interpretation was still in effect? Or,
should a defense allow the parties to shield themselves from liability
for relying in good faith on the old binding judicial interpretation?
The courts in the Seventh Circuit faced such a dilemma in 2014
after a change in that circuit’s judicial interpretation of the venue
provision in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). 1 The
* J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; M.S., Accountancy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013;
B.M., International Accountancy, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,
2012.
1
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1062,
1065 (N.D. Ill. 2015) [hereinafter Oliva I], aff’d, 825 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016)
[hereinafter Oliva II], and vacated on reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017)
[hereinafter Oliva III]. All of the district court decisions on point other than Oliva I
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FDCPA requires that a debt collector who sues to collect a consumer
debt must sue in the “judicial district or similar legal entity” where the
debtor lives or signed the contract in question. 2 In 1996, in Newsom v.
Friedman, the Seventh Circuit interpreted “judicial district” to mean a
circuit court. 3 Thus, for example, when a debt collector file suit in
Cook County, the “judicial district” is the Circuit Court of Cook
County and the debt collector can file suit in any of the county’s six
municipal districts, as long as the debtor resides in Cook County or
signed the underlying contract there. 4
In 2013, relying on Newsom, a debt collection law firm Blatt,
Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC (“BHLM”) filed suit against a
debtor, Ronald Oliva, in the first municipal district of Cook County in
downtown Chicago. 5 Oliva did not reside in that district at the time the
lawsuit was filed. 6 While the lawsuit was pending, the Seventh Circuit
overruled Newsom and issued a new rule in Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions,
LLC that interpreted the “judicial district or similar legal entity”
have ruled in favor of retroactive application of Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC. See
757 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Oberg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker
& Moore, LLC, No. 14 C 7369, 2015 WL 9478213, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2015);
Desfassiaux v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 667,
674 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding in favor of retroactive application of Suesz); Browne v.
John C. Bonewicz, P.C., No. 14 CV 6312, 2015 WL 6165033, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
20, 2015) (same); Rowan v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 14 CV
08923, 2015 WL 5920873, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2015) (Chang, J.) (same); Conroy
v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 14 C 6725, 2015 WL 5821642,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015) (same); Portalatin v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker &
Moore, LLC, 125 F. Supp. 3d 810, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (same); Maldanado v.
Freedman Anselmo Lindberg, LLC, No. 14 C 6694, 2015 WL 2330213, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. May 14, 2015) (same). It is also interesting that Oliva is one of the twenty-eight
retroactive Suesz cases that the debtor Oliva’s attorneys filed against BHLM between
August 2014 and July 2015, and that the debtor Oliva testified, “I would say it only
matters to me because it matters to my lawyer.” See Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.
2
15 U.S.C. § 1692i (2012).
3
Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled by Suesz,
757 F.3d 636.
4
Id. at 819-20.
5
Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.
6
Id.
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language in the FDCPA’s venue provision to mean “the smallest
geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the court
system in which the suit is filed.” 7 Such an area can be smaller than a
county if the court system there uses smaller districts, such as the six
districts of Circuit Court of Cook County. 8 Eight days later, BHLM
voluntarily dismissed its pending lawsuit against Oliva. 9
About one month later, Oliva sued BHLM under the FDCPA
alleging that BHLM violated the venue provision in § 1692i when it
filed a collection suit against him at the Daley Center rather than at a
Cook County courthouse closest to his residence. 10
The district court ruled in favor of BHLM (Oliva I). 11 Oliva
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s
decision (Oliva II). 12 Then the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en
banc (Oliva III), where it refused to apply Suesz only prospectively,
concluding that the debt collector’s venue choice violated the FDCPA
and that the bona fide error defense did not apply to BHLM’s
violation. 13 In the petition for the rehearing en banc, Oliva argued,
among other things, that the panel decision in Oliva II incorrectly
applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, which held that the bona fide error
defense under the FDCPA was not available with respect to a mistake
of law. 14 The panel in Oliva II read Jerman to mean that only a debt
collector’s own mistaken interpretation of the law would prevent the
application of the bona fide error defense, and found that BHLM’s
reliance on Newsom was not a mistake of law on BHLM’s part, but
7

Id. (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 638).
Suesz, 757 F.3d at 648; Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1066.
9
Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 1067.
12
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 825 F.3d 788, 793 (7th
Cir. 2016), on reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017).
13
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 864 F.3d 492, 497–99
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
14
Id. at 495; Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559
U.S. 573, 576 (2010).
8
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rather an unintentional bona fide error for which such defense
remained available. 15 In contrast, the en banc court in Oliva III read
Jerman more broadly, concluding that the bona fide error defense is
not available with respect to all mistakes of law, including where a
debt collector relies in good faith on a binding court’s interpretation of
the law that is later overruled. 16 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that reliance on the court’s precedent is permitted only if
there can be no doubt whatsoever as to the accuracy of the court’s
interpretation of the law. 17 Consequently, the en banc Seventh Circuit
held that BHLM was not excused under the safe harbor of the bona
fide error defense. 18
Part I of this article discusses the FDCPA, its venue provision and
the bona fide error defense, and the retroactive application of judicial
decisions. Part II reviews the facts and holdings of the Seventh
Circuit’s en banc decision in Oliva III, as well as the district court
decision in Oliva I and the Seventh Circuit panel decision in Oliva II.
Finally, Part III asserts that the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in
Oliva III was improperly reasoned and decided.
THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Concerned about debt collectors’ use of abusive, deceptive, and
unfair debt collection methods, Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977
to establish some nationally-uniform controls on debt collection
methods. 19 Congress noted that abusive debt collection practices
15

Oliva II, 825 F.3d at 792.
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 498.
17
Amy Jonker, 7th Cir. Divided Panel Holds Debt Collector Liable under
FDCPA Despite Changes in Underlying Law at Issue, CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. BLOG
(Aug. 3, 2017), http://consumerfsblog.com/2017/08/7th-cir-divided-panel-holdsdebt-collector-liable-fdcpa-despite-changes-underlying-law-issue/.
18
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 500.
19
15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012); Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d
227 (3d Cir. 2005); Philip White Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of
Venue Provision of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(i), 28
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 523 (2008).
16
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contributed to the number of personal bankruptcies, marital instability,
the loss of jobs, and to invasions of personal privacy. 20 Congress
stated three purposes of the FDCPA: (1) “to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors”; (2) “to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are
not competitively disadvantaged”; and (3) “to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 21 The
FDCPA deters abusive debt collection practices, 22 and “imposes civil
liability on ‘debt collector[s]’ for certain prohibited debt collection
practices.” 23 Among other provisions, the FDCPA prohibits debt
collectors from making false representations as to a debt’s character,
amount, or legal status; communicating with consumers at unusual and
inconvenient times or places; or using obscene language, violence, or
threats. 24
The FDCPA is enforced both through administrative actions and
private lawsuits. 25 The following sections explain relevant FDCPA
provisions and judicial interpretations.
20

§ 1692(a).
§ 1692(e).
22
Shauna Cully Wagner, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Bona Fide Error Defense, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1692k(c), 14 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 207 (2006).
23
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573,
573 (2010) (alteration in original).
24
See generally §§ 1692b–1692j; Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–93
(1995).
25
§§ 1692k–1692l. In administrative actions, for example, debt collectors are
subject to penalties of up to $16,000 per day if they acted with “actual knowledge or
knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that [their actions
were] unfair or deceptive and [were] prohibited [by the FDCPA].” § 45(m)(1)(A)–
(C); see also Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 16 C.F.R. §
1.98(d) (2010) (adjusting the maximum civil penalties to $16,000). In civil cases, in
addition to actual damages, courts may award statutory damages up to $1,000 in any
action by an individual, or, in a class action, award up to “the lesser of $500,000 or 1
[percent] of the net worth of the debt collector.” § 1692k(a); see Vartan S. Madoyan,
Attorneys Beware: Jerman v. Carlisle Holds You Liable for Technical Legal Errors
under the FDCPA, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2011).
21
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A. Venue Provision of the FDCPA
The venue provision of the FDCPA limits the venues in which
debt collectors can file legal actions to collect consumer debts,
providing in pertinent part that:
Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt
against any consumer shall—
(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in
real property securing the consumer’s obligation, bring
such action only in a judicial district or similar legal
entity in which such real property is located; or
(2) in the case of an action not described in
paragraph (1), bring such action only in the judicial
district or similar legal entity—
(A) in which such consumer signed the contract
sued upon; or
(B) in which such consumer resides at the
commencement of the action. 26
When a debt collector files a debt collection suit in the wrong venue,
the FDCPA permits the consumer to sue the debt collector and recover
“actual damage[s],” costs, “a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined
by the court,” and statutory “additional damages.” 27
In accordance with § 1692n, federal courts have ruled in several
cases that state venue statutes or rules must yield to the venue
provision of the FDCPA. 28 As applied to debt collection actions in
state courts, “§ 1692i must be understood not as a venue rule but as a

26

§ 1692i(a) (emphasis added).
§ 1692k.
28
See e.g., Harrington v. CACV of Colo., LLC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134 (D.
Mass. 2007); McKnight v. Benitez, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
27
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penalty on debt collectors who use state venue rules in a way that
Congress considers unfair or abusive.” 29
The following sections detail the Seventh Circuit precedent on the
venue issue under the FDCPA, Newsom and Suesz. 30 The debt
collector BHLM in Oliva filed the debt collection claim against the
debtor Oliva when Newson was in effect. While the case was pending,
the Seventh Circuit issued Suesz, overruling Newsom.
1. Newsom v. Friedman
In Newsom, the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the venue provision
of the FDCPA, expressly held that for consumer debt collection suits
in Cook County, Illinois, the relevant “judicial district” in which the
debt collector could file the debt collection suit was the entire county
and not the smaller municipal districts within the county. 31 The
Seventh Circuit explained that the statutory language of the FDCPA
was not ambiguous in the context of this case, 32 and thus an Illinois
circuit court constituted a “judicial district or similar legal entity”
where a debtor resides under the plain meaning of the FDCPA. 33 The
court pointed to the procedural rules of the circuit court, which
provided that any action may be assigned to any circuit court judge in
Cook County for hearing or trial, regardless of the municipal
department, division or district in which the case was filed. 34 The
circuit court possessed original jurisdiction, and the division of the
circuit court into subordinate divisions was for administrative purposes
only, rather than for jurisdictional purposes. 35 This interpretation of the

29

Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 653 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
There is no Supreme Court precedent on this issue.
31
Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled by Suesz,
757 F.3d 636.
32
Id. at 816–17.
33
Id. at 820.
34
Id. at 818–19; ILL. COOK CTY. CIR. CT. R. Order 1, ¶ 1.3(a).
35
Newsom, 76 F.3d at 818.
30
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venue provision in the FDCPA was controlling law for eighteen
years—until the Suesz decision.
2. Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC
In Suesz, some eighteen years later, the Seventh Circuit, in a
divided en banc opinion, held that the “judicial district or similar legal
entity” for purposes of § 1692i is the smallest geographic area that is
relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the suit is
filed. 36 The geographic area can be smaller than a county where the
court system uses smaller districts, such as the township small claims
courts in Marion County, Indiana that were at issue in Suesz. 37
Overruling Newsom, the court in Suesz ruled that the smallest
geographic area was the township where the debtor lived or where the
contract giving rise to alleged debt had been signed. 38 Therefore, the
township’s small claims court was the proper venue for purposes of an
FDCPA claim, even though state trial courts in Indiana were organized
by county for both court administration and venue purposes; and the
Indiana statute and court rule regarding venue in effect at the time
permitted debt collectors to bring an action in any one of the nine
small claims courts located in the county where the debtor resided or
the contract was signed. 39
Judge Hamilton and Judge Posner, in their joint opinion for the
majority, explained that although the FDCPA does not define “judicial
district,” the statute’s inclusion of the phrase “or similar legal entity”
indicated that it was drafted broadly—presumably so the venue
provision could be applied flexibly to all court systems around the
country, which vary in structure and nomenclature. 40 The court thus
36

Suesz, 757 F.3d at 648.
Id. (concluding that if a debt collector chooses to file suit in a township small
claims court, venue is determined at the township level, whereas if the debt collector
chooses to file suit in a circuit or superior court, the debt collector could file it in a
courthouse in the center of the county).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 648–49.
40
Id. at 639.
37
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overruled Newsom, explaining that Newsom had adopted a test based
on the details of court administration rather than on the applicable
venue rules. 41
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Suesz; 42 therefore, the
Seventh Circuit’s decision is still the controlling law in this circuit.
B. Bona Fide Error Defense
Notwithstanding the civil liability provisions under the FDCPA,
the FDCPA permits a debt collector to avoid liability for violating the
FDCPA provisions if the debt collector “shows by a preponderance of
evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a
bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 43 Under certain
circumstances, this defense provides a safe harbor for debt collectors
who improperly file a claim in the wrong venue. 44
However, in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich
LPA, the Supreme Court held that the bona fide error defense to civil
liability under the FDCPA does not apply to a mistake of law—that is,
a violation of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector’s incorrect
interpretation of the FDCPA’s legal requirements. 45
In the Jerman case, the respondents, a law firm and one of its
attorneys (“Carlisle”), had filed a lawsuit in Ohio state court on behalf
of a mortgage company to foreclose on property owned by the
petitioner Karen L. Jerman, a debtor. 46 The complaint included a
“notice” that the mortgage debt would be assumed valid unless the

41

Id. at 638.
Med-1 Sols., LLC v. Suesz, 135 S. Ct. 756 (2014) (mem.).
43
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012).
44
See id.; see also Nichols v. Byrd, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 (D. Nev.
2006).
45
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573,
604–05 (2010).
46
Id. at 578.
42
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debtor disputed it in writing. 47 Jerman’s lawyer sent a letter disputing
the debt, and when the mortgage company acknowledged that the debt
had in fact been paid, Carlisle withdrew the suit. 48
Jerman then brought a putative class action against Carlisle,
asserting that they violated § 1692g of the FDCPA by erroneously
representing that a debt will be assumed valid absent a written
dispute. 49 Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector, within five days
of an “initial communication” about the collection of a debt, to send
the consumer a written notice containing, among other things, “a
statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of
the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the
debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.” 50
The district court heard the case and granted summary judgment
to the defendants, concluding that the notice violated § 1692g by
requiring Jerman to dispute the debt in writing. 51 However, because
the violation was not intentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and
occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error, the defendants were shielded from liability by
the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense. 52
Jerman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision and held that
the defense in § 1692k(c) is not limited to clerical or factual errors, but
extends to mistakes of law. 53 Factual errors, for instance, include a
debt collector sending a debtor a collection letter without knowing that
the debtor has filed for bankruptcy, regardless of the various
procedures the debt collector maintained to identify bankruptcy and to

47

Id. at 579.
Id.
49
Id.
50
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2012).
51
Jerman, 559 U.S. at 579. At that time, no Sixth Circuit precedential opinion
had addressed the issue, so defendants relied on another circuit court’s decision.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 580.
48
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ensure compliance of the FDCPA. 54 Clerical errors, for instance,
include a debt collector mailing a second collection letter shortly after
receiving consumer’s cease and desist letter—and thus violating the
FDCPA—notwithstanding the procedures it adapted to avoid any such
error. 55 In contrast, mistakes of law, for instance, include a debt
collector mistakenly interpreting a provision of the FDCPA. 56
Jerman petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which
reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision. 57 The Court first examined the
case using the elements of § 1692k(c). 58 The Court then stated that a
violation resulting from a debt collector’s misinterpretation of the
legal requirements of the FDCPA under § 1692k(c) cannot be
unintentional 59: it is a “common maxim, familiar to all minds, that
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or
criminally.” 60 The Court noted that the administrative-penalty
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which are expressly
incorporated into the FDCPA, apply only when a debt collector acts
with “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of
objective circumstances” that its action was “prohibited by [the
FDCPA].” 61 Given the absence of similar language in § 1692k(c), the
Court reasoned it was fair to infer that Congress chose to permit
injured consumers to recover damages for “intentional” conduct,
including violations resulting from a mistaken interpretation of the
FDCPA, while reserving the more onerous administrative penalties for
debt collectors whose intentional actions reflected “knowledge fairly

54

Novak v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Ill.

2016).
55

Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1034 (6th Cir. 1992).
Jerman, 559 U.S. at 578.
57
Id. at 605.
58
Id. at 576–77.
59
Id. at 581.
60
Id. (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833)).
61
Id. at 583–84 (alteration in original); 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), (C) (2012).
56
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implied on the basis of objective circumstances” that the conduct was
prohibited. 62
Second, the Court stated that § 1692k(c)’s requirement that debt
collectors maintain “procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error” is “more naturally read to apply to processes that have
mechanical or other such ‘regular orderly’ steps to avoid mistakes.” 63
Even though the majority conceded that some attorney debt collectors
may maintain procedures to avoid legal errors, nevertheless, it stated
that “legal reasoning is not a mechanical or strictly linear process.” 64
Therefore, the Court concluded that “the broad statutory requirement
of procedures reasonably designed to avoid ‘any’ bona fide error
indicates that the relevant procedures are ones that help to avoid errors
like clerical or factual mistakes.” 65
Moreover, the Court found additional support for this reading in
the statute’s context and history. 66 The Court noted that Congress had
essentially copied the relevant sections of the bona fide error defense
from the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) into the FDCPA. 67 In the nine
years between the TILA’s enactment and the FDCPA’s passage, the
three federal courts of appeals to consider the question had interpreted
the TILA’s bona fide error defense as referring to clerical errors; none
62

Jerman, 559 U.S. at 584; see also id. (comparing 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2012),
which allows courts to reduce liquidated damages relying on the Portal–to–Portal
Act of 1947 if an employer demonstrates that “the act or omission giving rise to such
action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act
or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938”); id.
(comparing 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(5)(A) (2012), a provision of Digital Millennium
Copyright Act authorizing court to reduce or remit the total award of damages where
“the violator was not aware and had no reason to believe that its acts constituted a
violation”).
63
Id. at 587 (emphasis added). The Court gave two examples: “the kind of
internal controls a debt collector might adopt to ensure its employees do not
communicate with consumers at the wrong time of day, § 1692c(a)(1), or make false
representations as to the amount of a debt, § 1692e(2).” Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 590.
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had interpreted the defense to extend to mistaken legal
interpretations. 68 Thus, the Court inferred that Congress agreed with
those interpretations when it enacted the FDCPA. 69 Additionally, the
Court reasoned that Congress’ amendment to the defense in the TILA,
but not in the FDCPA, to exclude errors of legal judgment, was not
evidence of Congress’s intent to give the defense in the FDCPA a more
expansive scope for several reasons. 70 First, the amendment did not
obviously change the scope of the TILA’s bona fide error defense in a
way material to the Court’s analysis, given the consistent
interpretations of three courts of appeals holding that the TILA defense
does not extend to mistakes of law. 71 Next, it was also unclear to the
Court why Congress would have intended the FDCPA’s defense to be
broader than the TILA’s. 72 Finally, the Court noted that Congress had
not expressly included mistakes of law in any of the parallel bona fide
error defenses elsewhere in the U. S. Code. 73
Further, the majority stated that this decision does not place
“unmanageable burdens on lawyers practicing in the debt collection
industry,” 74 because the FDCPA contains multiple provisions expressly
protecting against abusive lawsuits and provides courts discretion to
68

Id. at 589 & n.10 (citing Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 757–58 (2d
Cir. 1975) (bona fide error defense unavailable for reliance on a pamphlet issued by
the Federal Reserve Board); Haynes v. Hogan Furniture Mart, Inc., 504 F.2d 1161,
1167 (7th Cir. 1974) (bona fide error defense unavailable for reliance on advice from
private counsel); Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1974) (similar)).
However, none of them relied on a binding judicial decision. The Court also noted
that the interpretations by the three Federal Courts of Appeals may not have “settled”
the meaning of the TILA’s bona fide error defense. Id. at 590.
69
Id. at 590.
70
Id. at 591.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 592.
73
Id. at 593. The Court compared the bona fide error provision in the
Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4010(c)(2) (2012), which expressly
excludes “an error of legal judgment with respect to [obligations under that Act],” as
well as those in the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693m(c), 1693h(c)
(2012), which are silent as to mistakes of law. Id.
74
Id. at 604.
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adjust any additional damages and attorney’s fees. 75 Furthermore,
many state consumer protection and debt collection statutes contain
bona fide error safe harbors that are either silent as to, or expressly
exclude, legal errors. 76
RETROACTIVITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Another important consideration in analyzing the Oliva decisions
is the retroactivity of Suesz in declaring a new interpretation of the
FDCPA’s venue provision. The following sections analyze Supreme
Court precedent on when judicial decisions ought to be applied
retroactively.
A. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
The Supreme Court articulated its modern approach to decisional
retroactivity in the 1971 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson test. 77 The test
considers three factors: (1) whether the decision to be applied
nonretroactively establishes a new legal principle; (2) whether the
retroactive application of the new rule would further or retard the
rule’s operation, given its previous history, purpose, and effect; and (3)
whether the retroactive application would cause inequity to the extent
of “injustice or hardship.” 78 In Chevron Oil, the issue before the Court
was whether its decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 79—which resulted in the imposition of a one-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions—barred Huson’s action, even
though Rodrigue was decided after Huson’s action was commenced. 80
75

Id. at 597–98.
Id. at 601.
77
404 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1971), disapproved of by Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of
Judgments in American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 37, 45 (2014).
78
See Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 106–07 (quoting Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).
79
395 U.S. 352 (1969).
80
Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 98–99.
76
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The Court held that the Rodrigue holding should not be applied to bar
Huson’s action retroactively. 81
B. Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
The Supreme Court reexamined the retroactivity issue in
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith 82 and James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia,83 but left the issue unresolved. The Court
confronted it again in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, and,
by a clear majority, held that “this Court’s application of a rule of
federal law to the parties before the Court requires every court to give
retroactive effect to that decision.” 84
Note that there are instances of pure prospectivity and selective
prospectivity: the former indicates that a court refuses to apply the
decision not only to the parties before the court but also to any case
where the relevant facts predate the decision, while the latter indicates
that a court applies the rule to some but not all cases where the
operative events occurred before the court’s decision, depending on
the equities. 85
Therefore, the Supreme Court in Harper forbade only “selective
prospectivity,” where courts consider whether to apply a new rule
which the Court has already applied to the parties before it. 86 It did not
81

Id. at 100.
496 U.S. 167 (1990).
83
501 U.S. 529 (1991).
84
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 90 (1993).
85
See e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 535–38 (1991).
86
See Harper, 509 U.S. at 90; see also Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514
U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (noting, but not expressly addressing, that respondent Hyde
alleged “Harper overruled Chevron Oil insofar as the case (selectively) permitted the
prospective-only application of a new rule of law”); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-3, at 226 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the
Harper Court simply “did not hold that all decisions of federal law must necessarily
be applied retroactively” and explaining that the Supreme Court has never expressly
“renounced the power to make its decisions entirely prospective, so that they do not
apply even to the parties before it”).
82
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overrule Chevron Oil, which was an instance of “pure prospectivity,”
where the new rule was not applied to the parties before the Court
retroactively. 87
C. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the retroactivity issue
in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde. 88 The Court in Hyde held that
litigants cannot prevail by offering no more than their simple reliance
on the old law as a basis for creating an exception to Harper’s
retroactivity rule, or arguing that a court’s refusal to apply the new
federal law to the parties in a prior case was an effort to create a
“remedy,” rather than being based on “non-retroactivity.” 89 However,
the Court stated that prospective-only effect may be given under
special circumstances “where [a] new rule, for well-established legal
reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case.” 90 Under such
special circumstances, a court may find (1) an alternative way of
curing the constitutional violation; (2) a previously existing,
independent legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for
denying relief; 91 (3) as in the law of qualified immunity, a wellestablished general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, which
general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy
87

See Harper, 509 U.S. at 90; Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100
(1971). The Ninth Circuit recently held that, in the absence of explicit overruling, it
was still bound to apply new rules purely prospectively when the three Chevron Oil
factors so required. See Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F. 3d 684, 690–95 (9th Cir.
2011); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (1997). However, we need not address the
“pure prospectivity” issue here because the Seventh Circuit already determined to
apply the new rule to the parties before the court in Suesz.
88
514 U.S. 749 (1995).
89
Id. at 754.
90
Id. at 758–59.
91
See e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t
of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 40–41 (1990) (finding that where the
violation depends, in critical part, upon differential treatment of two similar classes
of individuals, then one might cure the problem either by similarly burdening, or by
similarly unburdening, both groups).
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justifications; 92 or (4) a principle of law 93 that limits the principle of
retroactivity itself. 94 Therefore, Hyde allows a court to not apply a new
rule retroactively even if the court which declared the new rule has
applied it to the parties before the court.
Today, when the Court has applied a rule of federal law to the
parties before the Court, courts consult Harper and Hyde to determine
whether to give that decision retroactive application. 95 In the absence
of explicit overruling, courts still need to apply new rules purely
prospectively when the three Chevron Oil factors so require. 96
OLIVA V. BLATT, HASENMILLER, LEIBSKER & MOORE LLC
The following sections explain the factual and procedural
background of the Oliva case, and the district court’s and the Seventh
Circuit’s decisions.
A. Factual Background
In 2002, Ronald Oliva, the plaintiff-debtor, opened an HSBC
MasterCard account in Chicago while a student at DePaul University,
92

See e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that
government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages to avoid excessive disruption of government insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known).
93
See e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (concluding that a habeas
corpus petitioner cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy where doing so would
require the habeas court to retroactively apply a new rule of criminal law). However,
“the Teague doctrine embodies certain special concerns–related to collateral review
of state criminal convictions—that affect which cases are closed, for which
retroactivity-related purposes, and under what circumstances.” Hyde, 514 U.S. at
758.
94
Hyde, 514 U.S. at 759.
95
See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); Hyde, 514 U.S.
at 758–59.
96
See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 (1971); Nunez-Reyes v.
Holder, 646 F. 3d 684, 690–95 (9th Cir. 2011).
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and continued to use the account during his subsequent employment
with CDW at its downtown office. 97 Oliva lived and worked in
Chicago almost continuously from 2002 until he moved back home to
Orland Park, Illinois in August 2013. 98
Oliva ended up falling behind on his credit card payments and
HBSC charged off his account in 2012. 99 At the end of 2012, Oliva’s
HSBC account had a final balance of $8,205.20. 100 Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC (“PRA”) ultimately acquired Oliva’s account. 101
On behalf of PRA, the law firm BHLM filed a collection suit in
2014 against Oliva in the Circuit Court of Cook County. 102 For such
relatively small claims, the Circuit Court of Cook County divides the
county into six municipal districts for venue purposes. 103 BHLM filed
the suit against Oliva in the first municipal district at the Richard J.
Daley Center in downtown Chicago. 104
In deciding where to file suit, BHLM relied on Newsom, which
held that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a single “judicial
district” for purposes of the FDCPA’s venue provision, allowing a debt
collector to file a suit in any of the circuit court’s six districts as long
as the debtor lived in Cook County or signed the underlying debt
contract there. 105 BHLM’s standard practice after Newsom was to sue
all Cook County residents in the first municipal district even if the
debtor, like Oliva, lived in a different municipal district. 106
97

Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1062,
1063 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 825 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016), and vacated on reh’g en
banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017). Oliva graduated from DePaul University in 2005
and worked at CDW until August 2015. Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1064.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1063–64.
105
Id. at 1064; see Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1996),
overruled by Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
106
Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.
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At the time the collection suit was filed, Oliva lived in Orland
Park, which falls within the Cook County Circuit’s fifth municipal
district, not the first municipal district. 107 Oliva retained counsel, but
never challenged venue in the collection suit. 108 Indeed, Oliva
admitted that the first municipal district Daley Center courthouse was
a more convenient forum for him than the fifth municipal district
Bridgeview courthouse, the closest Circuit Court of Cook County to
his residence. 109
On July 2, 2014, while BHLM’s debt collection suit against Oliva
was still pending, the Seventh Circuit overruled Newsom and held that
“the correct interpretation of ‘judicial district or similar legal entity’ in
§ 1692i [the FDCPA’s venue provision] is the smallest geographic area
that is relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the
case is filed.” 110 Eight days later, BHLM voluntarily dismissed the suit
against Oliva. 111
B. Procedural Background
Later in 2014, Oliva filed a lawsuit alleging that BHLM had
violated the FDCPA’s venue provision, § 1692i, by suing him in a
venue where he did not reside and had not signed the contract in
suit. 112 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 113 The
district court granted BHLM’s motion and denied Oliva’s motion. 114

107

Id. at 1063–64.
Id. at 1064.
109
Id.
110
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 638).
111
Id.
112
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 864 F.3d 492, 495
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
113
Id.
114
Id.
108
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C. The District Court’s Decision
The district court judge, Judge Elaine E. Bucklo, held that BHLM
had shown that its violation of the venue provision in § 1692i was the
result of a bona fide error in relying on the circuit precedent of
Newsom. 115 The court differentiated Jerman stating that the debt
collector in Jerman had relied on a non-controlling case, and therefore,
the debt collector could not escape liability relying on the bona fide
error defense because of his own mistaken interpretation of law. 116
However, here BHLM relied on Newsom, the then-controlling ruling
interpreting the FDCPA’s venue provision, and “did not exercise any
‘legal judgment’ of its own.” 117 Furthermore, the court drew an
analogy to another defense under the FDCPA for debt collectors who
rely on an advisory opinion by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to avoid liability even
if “such opinion is [later] amended, rescinded, or determined by
judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.” 118 Therefore,
BHLM’s reliance on Newsom was not a legal error that would
preclude the bona fide error defense to apply. 119
Moreover, the court rejected Oliva’s argument that Suesz—which
declared a new interpretation of the FDCPA’s venue provision while
BHLM’s debt collection case against Oliva was pending—should
apply. 120 The court stated that the debt collector in Suesz attempted to
extend Newsom’s holding to a different county court system, whereas
BHLM squarely relied on Newsom’s holding that the Circuit Court of
Cook County was one judicial district for purposes of the FDCPA
115

Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1067.
Id. at 1066.
117
Id. (quoting Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 394 F.3d 530, 538
n.9 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no mistake of law where debt collector relied on
implementing agency’s interpretation and did not exercise independent legal
judgment)).
118
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2012)).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 1066–67.
116
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filings. 121 Judge Bucklo noted that “[i]f the Seventh Circuit had
overruled Newsom in a case involving a Cook County collection suit,
the court may well have applied its ruling only on a prospective
basis.” 122 Judge Bucklo concluded that the retroactivity holding in
Suesz was limited to the parties in Suesz. 123
Accordingly, the court held BHLM’s violation of the FDCPA’s
venue provision was result of a bona fide error in relying upon the
then-binding precedent, thereby precluding liability under FDCPA. 124
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Panel Decision
On Oliva’s appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. 125
121

Id.
Id. at 1067 (citing Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 650 (7th Cir.
2014) (en banc) (permitting prospective overruling where “the law had been so well
settled before the overruling that it had been unquestionably prudent for the
community to rely on the previous legal understanding”)).
123
Id. (citing Suesz, 757 F.3d at 649 (“[A]dopting a new rule while refusing to
apply it to the parties before us would raise serious constitutional concerns.”)).
124
Id. at 1065. BHLM had also argued in the alternative that venue in the first
judicial district was proper on the ground that Oliva had signed the relevant contract
in that district. Id. Relying on Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 909 N.E.2d
876, 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), which held that “each time [a] credit card is used, a
separate contract is formed between the cardholder and bank,” BHLM argued that
“Oliva signed separate contracts with HSBC each time he used his MasterCard in the
City of Chicago while attending DePaul University and working at CDW’s
downtown office.” Id. (alteration in original). “Oliva counter[ed] that credit card
agreements are considered oral contracts, which are incapable of being ‘signed’
within the meaning of the FDCPA’s venue provision.” Id. (citations omitted). The
district court did not address that argument. Id.
125
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 825 F.3d 788, 793
(7th Cir. 2016), on reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017). The panel included
Judge Bauer, Flaum, and Manion, and Judge Manion authored the opinion. Id. at
789. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, “construing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Id. at 791; see Hammarquist v. United Cont’l Holdings, 809
F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2016).
122
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Even though the panel noted in Oliva II that Suesz did not specify
the scope of its retroactivity, the judges assumed without deciding that
Suesz’s holding would apply retroactively to BHLM, and held that
BHLM’s decision to file suit in the first municipal district of the
Circuit Court of Cook County violated § 1692i as interpreted by
Suesz. 126 The parties did not dispute that BHLM’s violation was
unintentional or that BHLM maintained procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid the error that led to the violation. 127 Therefore, the
panel focused only on the issue of whether the violation was the result
of a bona fide error. 128 The court reasoned that “Newsom’s
unambiguous holding expressly permitted [BHLM] to file suit exactly
where it did,” and that “Suesz may have created a retroactive cause of
action for violations that preceded it, but it did not retroactively
proscribe the application of the bona fide error defense.” 129 Therefore,
the court held that BHLM’s violation of § 1692i as interpreted by
Suesz was the result of a bona fide error that precluded liability under
the FDCPA. 130
The panel also found that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jerman
did not apply to mistakes of law that relied on controlling circuit
precedent. 131 First, the panel stated that Jerman applied only when the
debt collector’s violation resulted from the debt collector’s mistaken
interpretation of the law. 132 Here, BHLM simply abided by the judicial
interpretation in Newsom and did not make “an independent (and
entirely futile) ‘interpretation’” of the FDCPA’s venue provision,
“which Newsom had already definitely interpreted and handed down
as the binding law of this Circuit.” 133 Newsom, the then-controlling

126

Oliva II, 825 F.3d at 790–91.
Id. at 791.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 791–92.
131
Id. at 792.
132
Id.
133
Id.
127

176

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/6

22

: The Cost of Obeying the Law?: The Seventh Circuit Rejects the Bon

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13, Issue 1

Fall 2017

law, expressly permitted BHLM’s conduct. 134 Thus, the court
concluded that if BHLM’s venue choice under Newsom was the result
of a mistaken interpretation of the FDCPA, it was the result of the
Seventh Circuit’s mistaken interpretation, not BHLM’s. 135 “[BHLM’s]
failure to foresee the retroactive change of law heralded by Suesz was
not a mistaken legal interpretation, but an unintentional bona fide error
that preclude[d] liability under the [FDCPA].” 136
Second, even if BHLM’s violation was the result of its own
interpretation of the law, BHLM’s interpretation was not mistaken
when it was made, resulting in Jerman inapplicable. 137 It was the
retroactive change of the law—entirely outside BHLM’s control—that
caused BHLM’s conduct later to be deemed a violation under Suesz,
not BHLM’s mistaken interpretation of the FDCPA. 138
The panel then concluded that BHLM had shown by a
preponderance of evidence that its challenged conduct was the result
of an unintentional good-faith mistake that it took every reasonable
precaution to avoid; accordingly, the bona fide error defense
applied. 139 Therefore, the panel affirmed that the district court properly
granted summary judgment to BHLM. 140
E. The Seventh Circuit’s Rehearing En Banc
Oliva petitioned for rehearing en banc under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 35, arguing that the panel decision conflicted
with both the en banc decision in Suesz and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Jerman. 141 The Seventh Circuit granted en banc review,
134

Id.
Id.
136
Id. at 790.
137
Id. at 792.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 864 F.3d 492, 495
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
135
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and eventually vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded
for proceedings consistent with its opinion.142
The en banc court, in an opinion written by Judge Hamilton, first
examined the venue issue. 143 The court emphasized the FDCPA’s
congressional purpose “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices
by debt collectors,” which include “abusive forum-shopping by debt
collectors choosing the venues for lawsuits to collect consumer
debts.” 144
The court then analyzed the Seventh Circuit precedent
interpreting the venue provision of the FDCPA, noting that Newsom
allowed debt collectors in Cook County to choose freely among the six
different municipal department districts when BHLM initially filed the
debt collection case, for purposes of the FDCPA. 145 Regardless of the
sharp change in the interpretation, the court acknowledged that the
reasoning and holding of Suesz, decided while BHLM’s debt
collection’s case was pending, “clearly extend[ed] to the municipal
department districts in Cook County, Illinois.” 146
The court went on to discuss the retroactivity issue under Suesz. 147
The en banc decision in Suesz refused to give the decision only
prospective effect, and applied the new rule to Suesz itself. 148 The
court acknowledged that as a general rule, judicial decisions are given
retroactive effect, unlike legislation, which ordinarily is not given
retroactive application. 149 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court sometimes
142

Id. at 494. The court elected not to schedule a further oral argument because
the court noted that the issues were presented sufficiently in the briefs and opinions
under review. Id.
143
Id. at 495.
144
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
145
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 496.
146
Id. Suesz overruled Newsom and held that a “judicial district or similar legal
entity” under § 1692i is “the smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining
venue in the court system in which the case is filed.” Id. (quoting Suesz v. Med-1
Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc))
147
Id. at 497.
148
Id.
149
Id.
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applied its rulings in civil cases only prospectively “to avoid injustice
or hardship to civil litigants who have justifiably relied on prior
law.” 150 However, a prospective-only ruling would be “impermissible
unless the law had been so well settled before the overruling that it had
been unquestionably prudent for the community to rely on the
previous legal understanding.” 151 The court in Suesz hypothesized that
if a circuit court of appeals had continued to follow Newsom but the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Suesz and reversed, neither
Newsom nor the panel’s decision in Suesz would have justified the
Supreme Court giving its decision only prospective effect. 152 The
court also reasoned that none of the Supreme Court’s FDCPA
decisions against debt collectors have given any sign of applying their
holdings only prospectively. 153
The court claimed that “[t]he panel opinion in this case declined
to apply the Suesz holding on retroactivity,” that the panel noted that
“Suesz ‘did not specify the scope of its retroactivity,’” and that “the
panel assumed without deciding that the Suesz retroactivity holding
would apply to [BHLM].” 154 The court then went on to consider the
good-faith mistake issue under § 1692k(c). 155
As noted by the court in Oliva III, the Supreme Court in Jerman
held that the bona fide error defense in § 1692k(c) does not apply to “a
violation of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector’s incorrect

150

Id. (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 649).
Id. (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 650).
152
Id.
153
Id.; see Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S.
573 (2010).
154
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 497 (majority opinion) (quoting Oliva v. Blatt,
Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 825 F.3d 788, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2016), on
reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017)). However, the panel in Oliva II, joined
by Judge Kanne, disputed in the dissenting opinion that “[t]he panel explicitly
assumed that Suesz’s retroactivity did apply in this case—applied it—and then
concluded that the bona fide error defense excused [BHLM] from liability for its
retroactive violation.” Id. at 503 (Manion, J., dissenting).
155
Id. at 498 (majority opinion).
151
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interpretation of the requirements of that statute.” 156 The en banc court
in Oliva III disagreed with the panel in Oliva II that read Jerman
narrowly as applying only to the debtor collector’s own mistaken
interpretation of law but not to reliance on a precedent that was later
overruled as mistaken. 157 Instead, the court in Oliva III read Jerman as
to include all mistaken interpretations of the FDCPA, both mistakes
supported by “controlling” legal authority and those supported by
“substantial” legal authority. 158 The court also pointed out (and agreed
with) the Jerman decision that, if § 1692k(c) is a broad defense for
good-faith mistakes of law, it is not necessary to specify another safe
harbor under § 1692k(e) for the FTC advice. 159 Therefore, the court
concluded that the Jerman opinion rejected the application of §
1692k(c) to any legal errors concerning the FDCPA. 160 In essence, as
the court in Oliva III stated, the Court in Jerman read the FDCPA as
putting the risk of legal uncertainty on debt collectors, incentivizing
them to stay well within legal boundaries. 161
The court also noted that Newsom and the FDCPA permitted, but
did not require BHLM to sue Oliva in the venue it chose. 162 However,
the court acknowledged that “if any mistaken interpretations of the
[FDCPA] were made in good faith, it was in cases like this,” because
the debt collectors relied on circuit precedent in believing they could
file debt collections suits in any districts within the county. 163
156

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jerman, 559 U.S. at 604–05).
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 499 (quoting Jerman, 559 U.S. at 588 (“Debt collectors would rarely
need to consult the FTC if § 1692k(c) were read to offer immunity for good-faith
reliance on advice from private counsel.”)); see also id. (citing Jerman, 559 U.S. at
605–06 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Justice Breyer “emphasiz[ed] the safe
harbor for FTC advice as solution for legal uncertainty”)).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. The majority opinion in Oliva III clarified that they did not address the
situations where the FDCPA required a debt collector to file in such a venue that a
court later determined was prohibited. Id. at 501 n.5.
163
Id. at 500.
157
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Moreover, the court declared that a judicial decision interpreting a
statute is not the law, or the controlling law. 164 The court stated as
follows:
With a statute, however, the controlling law is and always has
been the statute itself, as enacted by both houses of Congress
and signed by the President. One judge or a panel of judges
may or may not understand that text correctly, but the statute
remains the law even if judges err. . . . Defendant was
mistaken about the meaning of the statute, and so were the
panels in Newsom and Suesz. The fact that different sets of
lawyers, including those with judicial commissions, made a
legal error does not make it less a legal error. 165
Nevertheless, the court stated that in determining damage when the
FDCPA safe harbor is not available, the court “shall consider, among
other relevant factors . . . the extent to which such noncompliance was
intentional.” 166
The court concluded the discussion by comparing the debt
collection cases with certain Fourth Amendment cases. 167 The
Supreme Court recognized a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule for Fourth Amendment violations when police officers reasonably
relied on facially valid search warrants in United States v. Leon. 168
Then, in Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court extended the goodfaith exception to searches—that would otherwise be Fourth
Amendment violations—conducted in objectively reasonable reliance

164

Id.
Id.
166
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1) (2012)).
167
Id.
168
Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). The exclusionary
rule under the Fourth Amendment indicates that evidence illegally seized by law
enforcement officers in violation of a suspect’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be used against the suspect in a criminal prosecution.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
165
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on binding appellate precedent. 169 The en banc court in Oliva III
stated that such extended rule was unusual, and it was based on “the
exclusionary rule’s ‘high cost to both the truth and the public safety,’
and the absence of offsetting benefits resulting from deterring police
misconduct when the police are complying with circuit precedent.” 170
The court then distinguished the interest in protecting debt collectors’
choice of venue from the stakes under the exclusionary rule as “not at
all comparable,” and concluded there was no need to create a similar
exception under the FDCPA. 171
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EN BANC DECISION DEPARTS FROM
PRECEDENT AND CONSISTENCY
The Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision was improper in at least
three respects, as discussed in the following sections: (1) retroactivity
of the new interpretation of the venue provision; (2) bona fide defense;
and (3) policy justification.
A. Retroactivity of the New Interpretation of the Venue Provision
It is undisputed that when the debt collector BHLM initially filed
the claim against Oliva in the first municipal district of the Cook
County, the venue choice was permissible under the then-binding
decision in Newsom, which interpreted the “judicial districts or similar
legal entity” under § 1692i as the entire county for Cook County,
Illinois, rather than the internal municipal department districts. 172
While the case was pending, the Seventh Circuit issued its en banc
decision in Suesz, overruling Newsom, under which BHLM’s venue
choice would be improper because Oliva resided in Orland Park, the
fifth municipal district, and BHLM filed the case in the first municipal
169

Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 500 (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229

(2011)).
170

Id. (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 232).
Id.
172
See id. at 496.
171
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district, a different “smallest geographic area that is relevant for
determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed.” 173
Oliva relied on the “new” law under Suesz to sue BHLM, alleging it
violated the FDCPA by filing the debt collection case in the wrong
venue. 174
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusions in Oliva III on retroactivity
depart from precedent and consistency for the following two
reasons. 175 First, Harper arguably applies only to the judicial rulings
of the Supreme Court interpreting federal law, where the court
determined that:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate the announcement of
the rule. 176
The court in Oliva III stated several times that if it were the Supreme
Court reversing the decision, the decision would have a retroactive
application; however, it overlooked the fact that the implication of a
Supreme Court decision may differ materially from that of a Seventh
Circuit decision, which could support the view that Harper applies
only to Supreme Court interpretations. 177
Second, even if Harper applies to judicial rulings of the circuit
courts, and not only to Supreme Court decisions, the retroactive
application of the new rule in Suesz itself did not extend automatically
173

See id.
Id. at 495.
175
See id. at 497.
176
See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 86 (1993) (emphasis
added); see also Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1045 (E.D.
Wis. 2010) (declining to apply Harper’s retroactivity rule to a Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision because “the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal
law is not at issue”).
177
See Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 497–500.
174

183
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or guarantee retroactivity to other cases. 178 Because the court in Suesz
already declined to give the new rule prospective-only effect, it was a
matter of selective prospectivity—whether Suesz applied to other cases
that involved similar conduct or events occurring prior to the date of
the decision—triggering analysis under Hyde. 179 In Hyde, the Supreme
Court made it clear that reliance alone may be insufficient to justify
prospective-only application; however, other special circumstances
may allow the court to depart from the norm of retroactive application
under such circumstances. 180 Had the court in Oliva applied Hyde, it
likely would have found a “previously existing, independent legal
basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief”—the
bona fide error defense. 181 Therefore, the court should not have
applied Suesz retroactively to Oliva because of the special
circumstance of the bona fide error defense.
B. Bona Fide Error Defense
Furthermore, even if Suesz created a cause of action for
retroactive violations of the venue provision in § 1692i, the Seventh
Circuit in Oliva III erred by rejecting the bona fide error defense in §
1692k(c). 182 The following sections explain the en banc court’s
misinterpretation of Jerman and Oliva III’s inconsistencies with the
FDPCA and its legislative intent.
178

See id. at 497; Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 649 (7th Cir.
2014) (en banc) (noting that “adopting a new rule while refusing to apply it to the
parties before [the court] would raise serious constitutional concerns,” but saying
nothing about applying the rules to other cases).
179
See Suesz, 757 F.3d at 649–50; Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S.
749, 758–59 (1995).
180
See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97; Hyde, 514 U.S. at 758–59.
181
See Hyde, 514 U.S. at 759; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012).
182
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 498–500; see also id. at 502 (Manion, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that, as the original panel in Oliva II, 825 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir.
2016), stated, Suesz may have created a cause of action for retroactive violations, but
it did not “retroactively proscribe the application of the bona fide error defense,” and
that Suesz said nothing about the bona fide error defense).

184
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1. Misinterpretation of Jerman
The Seventh Circuit erroneously relied on Jerman to reject any
bona fide error defense resulting from mistakes of law. 183 However,
Jerman materially differed from Oliva, and therefore did not mandate
the outcome in the latter case. 184
First, the court in Oliva III overlooked the distinction between a
debt collector’s own independent mistaken interpretation of the federal
law and a debt collector’s good faith reliance on federal judicial
interpretation of the federal law, even if that interpretation is later
overruled. 185 The Supreme Court in Jerman held that “[t]he bona fide
error defense in § 1692k(c) does not apply to a violation resulting from
a debt collector’s mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of
the FDCPA.” 186 However, the debt collector in Oliva, BHLM, did not
independently interpret the FDCPA’s venue provision when it filed the
suit in the first municipal district within Cook County. 187 It was simply
relying on the then-binding judicial interpretation under the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Newsom. 188
Second, the Seventh Circuit failed to find a clear and “manageable
way to distinguish between mistakes” supported by “substantial” legal
authority, as in Jerman, and those supported by “controlling” legal
authority, as in Oliva. 189 Substantial legal authority, as described in
Jerman and discussed in Oliva III, is non-binding and “at best
persuasive,” whereas controlling legal authority is binding in a given
183

See id. at 498–500 (majority opinion).
See id.
185
See id. at 498; Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,
559 U.S. 573, 574–75 (2010); see also Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382,
394 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that Jerman concerns with and controls in cases where
the debt collectors relied on persuasive legal authority regarding legal issues that
were unsettled by any relevant binding authority).
186
Jerman, 559 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
187
See Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 494–95.
188
Id.
189
See id. at 499.
184

185
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jurisdiction. 190 Therefore, it might have been a mistaken interpretation
of law for the debt collector in Jerman to erroneously rely on another
circuit court’s decision (substantial legal authority) when that issue
was unsettled by any relevant binding authority in its own circuit. 191
However, BHLM made no mistake of law at the time of filing, 192
when it correctly relied on the then-binding decision Newsom in this
circuit—controlling legal authority—where the issue was well settled
for eighteen years at that time. 193 That is a fundamental difference
from the mistakes supported merely by substantial, non-binding legal
authority.
Third, the Seventh Circuit en banc decision concluded that a
court’s legal error about the meaning of a statute does not make it less
a legal error because the statute itself is the only controlling law;
however, that conclusion is self-contradictory. 194 On one hand, the
Seventh Circuit likely mistook the controlling law as law that will
always control when it reasoned that “[o]ne judge or a panel of judges
may or may not understand that text correctly, but the statute remains
the law even if judges err. That is why overrulings of earlier statutory
decisions, like reversals by the Supreme Court, are retroactive.” 195
However, the judicial interpretations of federal statutes have always
been treated as controlling law just as the words of the statutes
themselves. 196 The judicial interpretation may evolve over time, as
190

See id. at 505 (Manion, J., dissenting).
See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 597.
192
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 502–03 (Manion, J., dissenting).
193
See id. at 494–95 (majority opinion).
194
See id. at 500.
195
Id.
196
See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964) (“[Section 1983 and other civil rights]
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so
far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
191

186
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well as the statue itself when Congress makes amendments. Therefore,
the judicial decision of the Seventh Court in Newsom interpreting the
FDCPA was the controlling law until Suesz, where the en banc court
adopted a new interpretation regarding the statute and that
interpretation became the new controlling law. On the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit en banc concluded that BHLM violated the FDCPA as
interpreted by Suesz, assuming implicitly that Suesz controlled. 197 But,
ironically, as the court claimed explicitly in Oliva III, a judicial
decision is not law, or controlling law. 198 Moreover, if as the court
stated the statute remains the (only) law even after judicial
interpretation changes, there is no change of law when the Seventh
Circuit declared a new judicial interpretation of the FDCPA’s venue
provision, but the provision itself remained the same. Consequently,
there is no new “law” in Suesz that needs to apply retroactively to
Oliva.
Finally, nothing in Jerman indicates that the Court intended to
prohibit the bona fide error defense from being used with respect to all
mistakes of law. 199 The Court expressly refused to consider whether §
1692k(c) applies when a violation results from a debt collector’s
misinterpretation of the legal requirements of state law or federal law
other than the FDCPA. 200 Moreover, the Court was clear in its warning
that “we need not authoritatively interpret the [FDCPA]’s conductregulating provisions to observe that those provisions should not be
assumed to compel absurd results when applied to debt collecting
attorneys.” 201 But the Oliva III decision is exactly an absurd result, by
punishing the debt collector for its venue choice expressly permitted
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a
criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.”).
197
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 494.
198
Id. at 500; see also id. at 509 (Manion, J., dissenting) (“By denying the
controlling effect of its own legal determinations, the court pulls the rug out from
under its own feet.”).
199
See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S.
573 (2010).
200
Id. at 580 n.4.
201
Id. at 600.
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under the then-controlling law, Newsom, and by giving superior
liability protection to factual and clerical errors as compared to goodfaith reliance on controlling judicial decisions.
Therefore, Jerman did not bind the court’s decision in Oliva, and
the Seventh Circuit should have applied the elements under § 1692(c)
to determine whether BHLM’s venue selection constituted an
excusable bona fide error.
2. Inconsistency with the FDCPA and Its Legislative Intent
Additionally, excluding all mistakes of law from the bona fide
error defense under § 1692k(c) runs afoul of the FDCPA’s legislative
intent and its other provisions.
Relying on the court’s binding interpretation to choose the venue
for filing an FDCPA suit is not an abusive debt collection practice of
the type that the FDCPA aims to eliminate. 202 BHLM’s choice of
venue was permissible under the then-binding law when it filed the
collection suit against Oliva. 203 Also, as Oliva admitted, the venue
where BHLM initially filed the suit was more convenient for Oliva
than the closest courthouse, the proper venue under Suesz. 204
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Oliva III, “if any mistaken
interpretations of the [FDCPA] were made in good faith, it was in
cases like this.” 205 Contrary to the FDCPA’s legislative intent to
regulate debt collection methods, the Seventh Circuit’s en banc
decision in Oliva III increased the legal uncertainty of debt collection
methods and discouraged debt collectors from following courts’
controlling precedent, enlarging the harmful risks to debtors.
Further, there is no reason to believe an agency’s advisory opinion
should be given more authority than a binding circuit court’s opinion.
202

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 495 (majority opinion).
204
Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1062,
1064 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 825 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016), and vacated on reh’g en
banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017).
205
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 500.
203
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The FTC may answer requests for advice when “[t]he matter involves
a substantial or novel question of fact or law and there is no clear
[FTC] or court precedent” or “[t]he subject matter of the request and
consequent publication of [the FTC] advice is of significant public
interest.” 206 Therefore, the FTC advisory opinions are supplementary
to court precedent, and the FTC will not issue advisory opinions if
there is clear court precedent, as was the case with the well-settled law
in Newsom. 207 Moreover, if relying on an FTC advisory opinion could
protect debt collectors from liability even if the opinion later is
amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be
invalid for any reason, 208 relying on binding judicial interpretation
should offer, at least, the same degree of protection. Additionally,
unlike the Court’s concern in Jerman of relying on private counsel’s
advice, as compared with an FTC advisory opinion, in the case of
Oliva, relying on a circuit court’s binding interpretation did not “give a
competitive advantage to debt collectors who press the boundaries of
lawful conduct.” 209 Congress sought to regulate debt collectors’
practices by requiring them to comply with the FDCPA’s provisions,
which is exactly what BHLM did in Oliva. 210
Therefore, the FDPCA and its legislative intent suggest the bona
fide error defense should have protected a debt collector who relied on
the binding judicial interpretation in filing suit in what subsequently
turned out to be the wrong venue, resulting in an FDCPA violation.

206

16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2016).
See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S.
573, 606 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring).
208
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2012).
209
See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 602 (majority opinion).
210
As the majority noted in Oliva III, Newsom permitted, but did not require,
BHLM to file the suit in the first municipal district. Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 499. But
that did not affect the analysis here because BHLM’s choice of venue was still in
compliance with the law.
207

189
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C. Policy Justification
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision was improper
when considered from a policy perspective.
1. Extra Burden on the Courts
The courts adjudicate cases based on the controlling law at that
time. The en banc decision in Oliva III will result in significant legal
uncertainty in the FDCPA, because the opinion states that judicial
interpretations and decisions (including Oliva III) are not controlling
law. 211 Therefore, the courts will have to independently interpret the
FDCPA every time when they hear cases, increasing the risk of
inconsistent interpretations of the FDCPA.
2. Extra Burden on the Public
As the dissent noted, Oliva III violates due process by not giving
fair notice to debt collectors of the FDCPA’s requirements. 212 “A
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate
persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or
required.” 213 Therefore, it is not “unusual” to give exceptions to goodfaith mistakes by relying on the then-binding judicial interpretation of
federal statute. The court in Oliva III, however, penalized a lawabiding litigant who followed the then-controlling law, which is a
direct violation of this due process principle.
Additionally, the en banc decision in Oliva III diminishes the
court’s authority and credibility. 214 Under this decision, no protection
is available for good-faith reliance on the court’s controlling
211

See id. at 500.
Id. at 511 (Manion, J., dissenting).
213
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
214
Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 511 (Manion, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision also
gravely undermines the rule of law by discouraging debt collectors from following
this court’s controlling precedent.”).
212
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precedent, or even worse, a federal circuit court’s interpretation of
federal statute such as the FDCPA can no longer be viewed as
controlling. How can a party know what is legal if it is required to
follow only the statute, but not the applicable court of appeals cases
interpreting such statute? Consequently, the public has to understand
and interpret the law by themselves. But if our judges are unable to
make the right decision, how can we fairly impose liability on the
parties without legal training if they interpret wrongly? In the context
of the FDCPA, debt collectors have to hope that the existing judicial
interpretations related to their collection and litigation efforts do not
change before the case concludes or the statute of limitations runs, and
that the courts adjudicating their cases adopt the same interpretations.
Or, if debt collectors apply their own interpretation of the statute and
act differently from an existing judicial interpretation, they have to
hope that the courts adjudicating their cases do not rely on the existing
judicial interpretation and interpret the FDCPA provisions in the same
way as the debt collectors.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s en banc opinion in Oliva III was
erroneously reasoned in several aspects, and they reached an improper
decision as a result. The reasoning failed because Suesz should not
have been applied retroactively to this case, based on the special
circumstance exception under Hyde.
Furthermore, Jerman, which held that the bona fide error defense
does not extend to debt collectors’ mistaken interpretation of law, is
not instructive in Oliva, and therefore, even if Suesz applied
retroactively here, the bona fide error defense should have excused
BHLM’s liability for the violation of the FDCPA.
Finally, the en banc decision will result in extra burdens on both
the courts and the public, and diminish the court’s authority and
credibility. The public has to understand and interpret the law by
themselves and hope their interpretation will be same as the judicial
tribunal’s if challenged at the court.
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Accordingly, when deciding whether a new interpretation of the
federal statute should have retroactive effect to the parties before a
particular court, the court should apply the Chevron Oil test. Once it
decides to apply the new interpretation to the parties before the court,
the court then should consult the holdings in Harper and Hyde to
determine its retroactivity to other cases. In addition, the bona fide
error defense, if applicable, should excuse the liability for violations
resulted from good faith reliance on a then-controlling judicial
interpretation in the event that such judicial interpretation
subsequently evolves.
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